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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In late 2010 and early 2011 political protests in North Africa and the Middle East 
were initiated in several different countries by citizens who staked their claims and 
expressed grievances against their respective national governments. In Tunisia, citizens 
took to the streets in order to protest a regime under the leadership of  long-time President 
Zine El Avidine Ben Ali. Their efforts resulted in Ben Ali’s resignation and escape from 
the country. In Egypt, protests directed against the regime of Hosni Mubarak led to the 
toppling of Mubarak’s regime, just 18 days after the start of large-scale protests in Egypt 
(Peterson 2011).  In Syria, the government attracted the world’s attention after it resorted 
to brutal tactics that have resulted in the death of Syrian anti-government protesters 
(Koelbl 2011). These three episodes have all been included in a phenomenon commonly 
referred to as the Arab Spring; a wave of protests movements that spread across parts of 
the Arab world in late 2010 and the first months of 2011. Media outlets were quick to 
attribute the spread of these protests to the existence of populations with access to the 
internet that aided them in initiating and carrying out their protests. Furthermore, a lot of 
buzz has been made discussing how access to the internet fed the anger underlying the 
protests in these states (For example, see Glanz and Markoff 2011; Saletan 2011). The 
above begs the question: What effect does the internet have on the diffusion of political 
protests across national borders?  
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Commenting in Foreign Affairs, Lisa Anderson argues that the Arab Spring had 
fundamentally different patterns and origins in the various countries in which it occurred. 
Anderson (2011) reminds us that, long before the internet was even invented, a similar 
wave of political unrest occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya as far back as 1919. 
Without the internet, how did these protests seemingly spread across national borders in 
the same region as the ‘Arab Spring’? These historical examples give us reason to 
consider the issue of whether we are too quick to attribute certain phenomena to modern 
communications technology and lead us to the following question: Is the internet really 
playing a significant role in the diffusion of political protest across national borders? 
These are the questions that I address in this thesis in order to fill a gap that has been 
largely neglected within the existing political science literature. 
 While some research has been conducted on the impact of the internet and how it 
aids national and transnational organizations in achieving their goals, not much has been 
done on the diffusion of protests and contentious episodes across national borders. 
Consider the following examples of research on protests from the past 15 years. 
Rheingold (2003) investigated the role that the modern communications played in the 
removal of President Ferdinand Marcos from power in the Philippines. Citizens in the 
Philippines used text messaging and online communities in order to quickly organize 
protests against the regime. The online communities aided the anti-government 
movement in the country and provided a significant contribution to the organization of 
protests against the regime (Rheingold 2003). Other examples of studies on a national 
level have also focused on how modern communications aid groups in circumventing the 
regime in order to organize opposition in other countries (See for example Rahimi 2003; 
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Morozov 2009; Hirschkind 2010; George 2005).  While Rheingold and these other 
examples have conducted exemplary studies, they all primarily examined the role of the 
internet and communications technologies in a national context. 
Other scholars turned their attention in another direction and studied how activists 
from around the globe utilize the internet in order to make claims on transnational 
organizations. Several studies have been written on cases such as the ‘Battle of Seattle’ in 
which activists from all over the world expressed their grievances against the World 
Trade Organization (See for example Gill 2000; Levi and Olson 2000; Levi and Murphy 
2006). Van Laer and Van Aelst (2010) also show, followed by Walgrave and colleagues 
(2011), how the internet is transforming social movements in general and how it 
promotes transnational connections between various groups and causes. Scholars have 
also paid attention to how the global justice movement cooperates across national borders 
in order to make claims on transnational organizations such as the World Trade 
Organization (Bennett 2003).  
Two strands of research that is concerned with the internet and contentious 
episodes thus seem to emerge. Within the first group, scholars have studied the role of the 
internet in organizing anti-government groups in order to avoid detection by the regime, 
often with the ultimate goal of toppling them. The second group has focused on 
transnational groups and their use of the internet in organizing transnational groups and 
protests against transnational organizations. Scant attention has been paid by both groups 
as to whether the internet contributes to a general diffusion of protest across national 
borders in the absence of formal organizations and where groups have divergent targets 
for their claims.  
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Consider the following example. In the ‘Battle of Seattle’, transnational groups 
came together in order to protest against a single actor: the World Trade Organization. 
The groups that organize these types of protests against transnational organizations, or 
major state powers, have been the subject of study by scholars within political science 
and sociology. However, the issue of whether the internet will make such protest diffuse 
across national borders in the absence of formal organizations has not been investigated. 
This is the gap that I am to fill by examining the diffusion of contentious episodes 
regardless of the role of whether formal structures are in place through which organized 
activists can spread their claims across national borders.  In other words, I focus solely on 
how the internet affects the probability of a diffusion of political protest across national 
borders. 
By highlighting the impact of the internet on diffusion of conflicts across national 
borders this study fills a void identified by Tarrow and Tilly (2007) who called for further 
research concerning the “contested role” of the internet (Tarrow and Tilly 2007, p. 196) 
in contentious politics. This thesis sheds light on a phenomenon that has been taken for 
granted by many, especially in the media, but that has been empirically investigated by 
few scholars. To the author’s knowledge, no quantitative study has previously been 
conducted on this topic by scholars within political science and this thesis will provide 
the scholarly community with a stepping stone for future research.  
I provide a theoretical basis for why we would expect the internet to contribute to 
the spread of political protest across national borders. From this framework I develop a 
number of different hypotheses that are tested through quantitative, statistical analysis on 
the period from 1990 to 2005. The results of the empirical analysis provide us with a 
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word of caution regarding our assumptions about the correlation between internet usage 
and protest. The analysis does not find any evidence for the hypothesis that an increase in 
internet usage is correlated with an increase in political protest in the countries that are 
included in the study. Instead, the empirical result from this initial large-scale study on 
the topic suggests the opposite: an increase in internet usage is correlated with a decrease 
in political protest. I therefore argue that we should be careful not to overestimate the 
influence of the internet on the diffusion of political conflicts.  
This thesis is structured as follows. First, a literature review is conducted with a 
focus on the relevant literature within contentious politics and the transnational diffusion 
of contentious politics. Second, I turn to the theory section. In the theory section I 
examine the theoretical basis for my hypotheses. Third, the research design section is 
introduced with its focus on how the hypotheses will be operationalized and tested. In the 
fourth chapter I present the findings that are produced by the empirical analysis. I close 
the thesis with a conclusion where I discuss the results, what it means for the topic of 
contentious politics, as well as suggestions for future research paths on this topic. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
I choose to place the protests in Tunisia, Libya, Iran, and other places around the 
world under a category of events labeled ‘Contentious Politics’. This is a term that itself 
warrants some explanation. By ‘contentious politics’ I am referring to  interactions where 
actors make claims that bear on someone else’s interests where governments are the 
targets, objects of claims, or third parties to the claims. These claims can either be made 
peacefully, for example through organized protests, or violently through riots or 
revolutions. This creates a broad category of events that can be included in the scope of 
this paper.  For the purpose of this study I choose to narrow my attention to those 
instances where contentious politics take the form of protests, demonstrations, riots, and 
revolutions. The literature review will proceed as follows: In the first section of the 
literature review I turn my attention to the concept of contentious politics in order to 
explain what it is and to provide examples of contentious episodes. The review will then 
move on to focus more narrowly on the diffusion of contentious episodes across national 
borders after which I then turn my attention to the limited scholarship that is available 
concerning the internet and contentious politics. I then close the literature review with a 
brief summary of the literature that has been discussed. 
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Contentious Politics 
Contentious politics is a concept that has been used by scholars such as Charles 
Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and Doug McAdam in their quest to study various episodes where 
people make claims on governments, organizations, or other individuals (See for example 
Tilly and Tarrow 2007; Tarrow 1994; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Tilly 2003). The 
concept has been defined as: 
“interactions in which actors make claims that bear on someone else’s 
interests, leading to coordinating efforts on behalf of shared interests or 
programs” (Tarrow and Tilly 2007, p.202) 
Through this definition scholars have been able to include a host of different 
phenomena such as political protest, social movements, revolutions, and civil war under 
the rubric of contentious politics. It has been claimed that similar mechanisms and 
processes should be active in all of these episodes, even though they are different in kind, 
where collective action, politics, and contention interact with each other (McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, chapter 1-2; Tarrow and Tilly 2007). Contentious politics is far 
from a new phenomenon. In Cambridge, England, back in 1785 Thomas Clarkson 
became one of the world’s first professional organizers of collective claim-making when 
he, together with other anti-slavery advocates, advocated for the abolishment of slavery 
in Britain. The British anti-slavery activists made claims on authorities and initiated 
various performances in order to stake their claims and create awareness of their stance.  
Clarkson’s initiative also helped launch the world’s first transnational movement when 
opposition to slavery diffused to other countries (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, p. 1-2). A more 
recent example, which also happens to have a more violent nature, of a contentious 
episode is found in France where the North African population set fire to cars in 2005 in 
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order to express their grievances and dissatisfaction with their situation and the French 
government (Murphy 2005).  
Since the 1960s, new movements have started to emerge that are distinctly 
different from the movements that operated in the past. In examining these new 
transnational movements, scholars have found that they exhibit a remarkable vitality and 
frequently make claims that stretch beyond the boundaries of the nation-state (Della Porta 
and Tarrow 2005, p.1-3). Through social, cultural and geopolitical changes collective 
claim-making transformed from a mainly national dimension into a transnational 
dimension where movements now conduct claim-making across national boundaries 
directed at both national governments but also at international organizations. This 
transformation did not happen overnight. It developed during the latter half of the 20
th
 
century when organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Trade Organization, and the European Union emerged and tied state 
governments closer together through interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977). When 
these new entities developed it provided activists with new targets for their collective 
claim-making, targets which they shared with activists in other countries. This has led 
observers and scholars to talk about concepts such as a ‘global civil society’ where 
activists from all across the world co-ordinate in order to express their grievances against 
transnational organizations and national governments such as the United States (Della 
Porta 2005). Recently, scholars have started to pay closer attention to how actors from 
different countries get in contact with each other and engage in joint contentious action. 
But how do issues diffuse between different sites and what are the mechanisms that make 
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such diffusion possible? I will now turn my attention to how scholars have treated the 
diffusion of contentious politics.  
Diffusion of Contentious Politics 
Scholars within political science have not been foreign to the idea that contentious 
episodes have a potential to diffuse between different locations. In the following section, 
I provide a number of different examples that touch upon this point. The purpose of doing 
so is twofold. First, it demonstrates the fact that diffusion of contentious politics is an 
established concept with an extant literature that this study speaks to and builds upon in 
order to advance knowledge within political science. Second, this review will illustrate 
the void within the literature that this study attempts to fill through its theoretical and 
empirical contributions.  
In Mark Beissinger’s seminal work on the disintegration of the Soviet Union he 
captures the diffusion of contention that occurred across different ethnicities and their 
respective regions within the country (Beissinger 2002). Beissinger examines how 
different nationalities within the former Soviet Union staged protests that diffused from 
nationality to nationality in the beginning of the 1990s. When one nationality within the 
Soviet Union decided to demand more autonomy from the central government other 
nationalities quickly followed in their footsteps and did the same. In this case, it is likely 
that the decision by one group to stake their claims got the ball rolling and inspired other 
groups to follow suit. While Beissinger’s study of the Soviet Union is a commendable 
scholarly work, his main concern is with different nationalities that reside within the 
same state (Beissinger 2002). In other words, not only did they reside within the same 
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state, but the target for all of the different groups was also the same. Thus, while 
Beissinger’s efforts produced an excellent scholarly study on the diffusion of contentious 
politics within the Soviet Union, it does not say much about the diffusion of conflict 
across national borders when different actors make claims on different targets. 
Another example of diffusion can be found in the United States. College students 
at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, decided to build ‘shantytowns’ in order to 
protest the apartheid state in South Africa. Their protest gained national media attention 
and over forty shantytowns appeared on campuses all across the United States in a fairly 
short period of time (Soule 1997, 1999). While the diffusion of these shantytowns 
certainly received aid from modern media and communications, the main focus of the 
study was not on the influence of the internet in the diffusion of these protests. In 
addition, just like Beissinger’s study of the Soviet Union, this diffusion mainly took place 
within one country, and a specific population (college students) within that country. 
While both of these studies are concerned with the diffusion of contentious politics, they 
say little about the diffusion about contentious episodes across national borders.  
Other scholars within political science have paid attention to transnational 
diffusion. Tilly and Tarrow (2007) direct our attention to a movement that spread across 
national borders in an earlier era. When Thomas Clarkson decided to protest against 
slavery in England he probably did not have the intention of becoming one of the first 
professional organizers of collective claim-making in the world. Clarkson, together with 
other anti-slavery activists, advocated for the abolishment of slavery in Britain and made 
claims on authorities through various performances in order to further their claims and 
create both awareness and support of their position. According to Tilly and Tarrow 
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(2007), the British anti-slavery movement became the first transnational social movement 
when opposition to slavery diffused to other countries. While in this case a movement 
diffused across national borders, the claims that were being made in both the United 
Kingdom and abroad was largely the same. To a certain extent, the actors were also the 
same. For example, Tilly and Tarrow (2007) point to the fact that Clarkson and other 
activists traveled abroad in order to spark raise awareness for their cause.  
When it comes to more violent forms of contention, for example in the form of 
civil war, scholars have demonstrated that there is a regional clustering of civil war. 
States that border other states where civil war is occurring are much more likely to 
experience political turmoil themselves (Gleditsch 2007; Marshall and Gurr 2003). In 
order to explain why civil wars tend to diffuse across national borders scholars have put 
forward a number of different arguments. One argument suggests that issues and actors 
span national borders (Gleditsch 2005) while other scholars argue that conflict in one 
country will create a “demonstration effect” that inspires actors in other states to engage 
in collective claim-making against their own governments (Kuran 1998). Other scholars 
attribute the diffusion of contentious politics and political conflict to factors such as 
population movements (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). These studies are all concerned 
with the spread of political conflict across national borders within cases where the actors 
not necessarily have to be the same or share the same goals. However, like all of the other 
studies surveyed above there is a lack of attention paid to whether modern 
communications, such as the internet, have played any role in the diffusion of these 
conflicts.  
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As evidenced by the multiple examples provided above, transnational diffusion of 
contentious episodes has been studied by scholars in the recent decades. However, there 
is a significant lack of attention within the literature that deals with the issue of how 
modern communications, especially the internet, affect the diffusion of political conflict 
across national borders (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, p. 196). The existing literature deals 
primarily with how the internet aids in claim-making against supranational organizations 
(Bennett 2005; Samuel 2004) and not with how riots and protest diffuse across national 
borders. While the internet is a largely neglected factor in the literature, some work has 
been conducted on the influence of the internet on contentious politics. I will now turn to 
a study of that scholarship in order to demonstrate how scholars have considered the 
internet in their studies. 
Internet and Contentious Politics 
Within the scholarly literature on contentious politics a majority of the research 
on the influence of the internet has been conducted by scholars studying social 
movements and organized activists within the global justice movement. At a very basic 
level, digital communications, for example in the form of the internet, are considered to 
have a potential for reducing time constraints and communication costs. This is argued to 
enable citizens and organizations to stay in touch with each other and to maintain more 
contacts than in the past (Wellman 2001; Wellman et al 2003). By staying in touch, 
individuals will be better equipped to maintain and expand their own networks of 
personal and organizational connections. Scholars` have described this phenomenon as a 
way of creating ‘weak ties’ (See for example Haythorntwaite and Wellman 2002). 
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One of the themes in the scholarship has circulated around the scarcity of 
resources that characterize a majority of social movements that engage in collective 
action (Fisher and Boekkooi 2011).  For these social movements, the existence of the 
internet, e-mail, and list servers have the potential of reducing the costs. By reducing 
costs, these movements and organizations are able to distribute their message and bring 
attention to their cause even though they might have scarce resources (Fisher 1998; 
Almeida and Lichbach 2003). The argument here is fairly straightforward: if the cost for 
organizing is low, it should be easier for social movements to organize citizens and the 
number of protests should go up. An illustration of this can be found in a study by Danitz 
and Strobel (1999) where they argue that the internet enabled prodemocracy activists to 
communicate with each other in a cheap and efficient manner. 
Some scholars argue that a reduction in costs and time constraints is the only 
major effect facilitated by the use of the internet. In this view, the internet does little 
besides amplifying communication between, or within, political groups (Agre 2002). 
Along these lines, Tilly (2004) compares the invention of the internet to previous 
inventions such as the telegraph when he advises us to be cautious about assuming that 
the internet will revolutionize the way in which contentious politics and collective action 
is conducted. Previous inventions, like the telegraph, have had similar functions where 
they made communication cheaper and tied groups closer together with each other, but 
they did not fundamentally change the way in which they operated. According to Tilly, 
simple technological determinism and hyperbole should be avoided (Tilly 2004, chapter 
5). 
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There is however a partially deviating view of the internet and its role in 
collective action which argues that the internet is transforming collective action and that 
we need to formulate new theories of how the underlying processes of the internet.  
Scholars who take this position believe that the internet has a much larger potential than 
previous technological inventions to transform the way in which claim-making and 
collective action take place. Bennett (2003) argues that the previous scholarship 
regarding the internet and its potential focused too much on conventional organizations 
such as political parties and other hierarchically structured groups. Instead, he argues, we 
should focus our attention on how the internet affects loosely structured forms of 
activism and activists that stake claims on not only states, but also at multinational 
organizations and transnational corporations. The internet has thus provided transnational 
activists with a tool that they can use in order to organize opposition to organizations that 
operate in multiple countries, something that in the past almost remained unfeasible for 
most of these organizations (Bennett 2003). These activists are also able to operate 
independently from formal organizations by using the internet (Bennett et al 2008).   
Another effect that has emerged from the spread of the internet is that it has 
enabled political activists to expand their operations and to participate in multiple protest 
events. While in the past time constraints and long distances made it difficult to retain 
multiple ties and engagements, the internet today permits individuals to simultaneously 
fight for several causes and to become involved in different movements (Walgrave et al 
2011). However, as a word of caution Bennett (2003) also highlights an argument which 
claims that collective action based on digital media will create loosely structured 
movements that are difficult to coordinate and sustain and that online activity also has to 
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be combined with offline activity in order to create sustainable movements. This might 
indicate that collective action which is based on online communication is less effective in 
the long run than offline organizations and movements. 
On a national level, attention has been paid to the influence of the internet in a 
host of different studies. One practical example of successful use of the internet in 
coordinating collective action can be found in the case of MoveOn.Org.  Scholars have 
shown how MoveOn.Org used the internet in order to broaden public opinion and 
revitalize communicative action (Carty 2010). Meanwhile, Fandy (1999) instead directs 
our attention to how the internet helped activists in Saudi Arabia to spread their message 
while avoiding the barriers set up by the Saudi government. In yet another example, 
Norris (2002) examined the importance of information access and spread of the internet 
in authoritarian states such as China. While these studies provide us with some 
information regarding the internet’s potential in aiding national activists, it says little 
about the role of the internet in transnational activism. 
The area of transnational activism and collective action is however one of the 
areas in which the role of communication technologies and internet has started to be 
examined. Here, focus lies on understanding how the internet aids individuals in 
organizing and sustaining collective action even when it involves large geographical 
distances. In this transnational perspective, Bennett (2003) contends that the internet and 
digital media have transformed transnational contentious politics. To him, it appears like 
the internet facilitates the creation of vast webs of global activist networks that can 
launch transnational collective action and claim-making with relative ease (Bennett 
2003).  This argument is illustrated in a study conducted by Lichbach and Almeida 
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(2001). These two authors noted that during the ‘Battle of Seattle’ protests were 
simultaneously held in at least eighty-two cities around the world and that these protests 
were not organized centrally by the campaign coalition in Seattle. Instead, tactics and 
timing was communicated through the internet to activists on all of the different sites 
where protests took place (Lichbach and Almeida 2001). Furthermore, several scholars 
(Garrido and Halavais 2003; Martinez-Torres 2001; Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010) have 
examined how a local rebellion, the Zapatista movement, in Mexico quickly gained 
international fame and support through a global network through effective use of the 
internet. 
But while these examples all show a belief in a potential for the internet to aid in 
facilitating protests, some scholars still advise us to be cautious in assuming that the 
internet fundamentally  transforms and enhances the likelihood of vast webs of activists 
that create contentious episodes (see for example Tilly 2004; Bennett 2005). While 
generally optimistic about the internet’s potential in enabling activists and social 
movements, Bennett (2005) argues that we need to be aware of the fact that it is a 
combination of an online and offline relationship between individuals, activists, and 
groups within social movements that has the ability to make a movement powerful.  
Summary 
From the literature review, it is possible to discern a number of different ways in 
which the internet affects contentious politics and actors who engage in collective claim-
making. The internet has been shown to facilitate communication, make it more cost-
efficient to organize groups, allow individuals to create multiple engagements, enable 
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individuals and groups to cooperate over large distances, as well as revitalizing 
communicative action domestically within a country. Throughout this review, a picture 
has started to appear in which scholars have devoted considerable attention to how social 
movements and transnational activists are able to use the internet in order to effectively 
promote their cause. However, while these studies indicate that activists are finding new 
ways to organize and that transnational activism is increasing, they largely neglect the 
phenomenon of diffusion of protest between different countries. Little has been said 
about events such as the Arab Spring where protests appeared to spread from country to 
country and citizens ended up toppling their governments. The different movements in 
the two countries exhibited different origins and expressed different grievances 
(Anderson 2011). The claims made against the regime in Tunisia were made by different 
actors compared to the claims directed at the regime of Mubarak in Egypt. So how did 
the protests in Tunisia affect the protests that later took place in Egypt? And what was the 
role of the internet in that process?  
The studies that have been reviewed above do not provide us with much 
information that aids us in answering these questions. This illustrates the theoretical gap 
that this study sheds some light upon. For scholars and policy makers alike, the issue of 
how protests diffuse across countries appear should be important. If protests and political 
unrest occurs in one country, how should policy makers, politicians and citizens in other 
countries expect that it will affect their own situation? These are the questions that 
motivate this study and that haven’t been adequately been answered by past research. In a 
world that is often described as being closer than ever before due to globalization, 
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domestic events in foreign countries might confront policy makers with new challenges 
in the 21
st
 century. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THEORY 
Introduction 
In order to fill the gap within the literature it is first necessary to establish a 
theoretical linkage between the internet and contentious episodes. In order to narrow the 
scope of the thesis down to something that is more manageable, I will primarily be 
concerned with those contentious episodes that have been treated as protest events within 
the literature. This still includes various forms of riots, demonstrations, and revolutions 
that have been included in datasets in past studies. The causal relationship that connects 
the internet to the transnational diffusion of contentious episodes will here be made 
explicitly clear.  
This theory section will proceed as follows. First, I will define a number of 
important concepts that have been mentioned previously in the thesis such as ‘contentious 
politics’ and ‘contention’. This discussion will help to clarify the boundaries for the 
phenomena that this thesis is concerned with and those phenomena that are beyond the 
scope of this project. Next, I connect the independent and dependent variables that lay the 
foundation for the following hypotheses and empirical tests. After this I move to a 
formulation of four different hypotheses which are supported by the previous literature 
and the way in which media has portrayed episodes such as the Arab Spring. 
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What is “contentious politics”? Included in the term are phenomena such as social 
movements, political protest, revolutions, and civil wars. Admittedly, these different 
phenomena have mostly been treated as distinctly different types of events in most of the 
scholarly literature.  However, some scholars have argued that it is possible to bring all of 
these different types of events together under the same term, contentious politics, because 
they share the same underlying mechanisms. Contentious politics has been defined as 
combining the concepts of contention, collective action, and politics (Tarrow and Tilly 
2007). Together these concepts make up contentious politics. Since the scholarship 
within contentious politics and social movements is closely related to the topic of this 
thesis, I choose to place this work within this scholarly tradition.  
The first component of contentious politics is that of contention. When claims are 
made that bear on someone else’s interest contention arises. The parties making 
collective claims can be individuals, groups, and even institutions (Tilly and Tarrow 
2007, pp.4-5). The second component is that of collective action. Churches, voluntary 
associations, and neighbors who clear weeds from vacant lots are all engaging in a form 
of collective action. The third component, politics, refers to all those things that agents of 
government such as politicians and bureaucrats are tasked with doing. When we interact 
with agents of governments we operate within the realm of politics. For example when 
we apply for a driver’s license or show our passport to immigration officers. However, in 
these instances there is no contention involved since the actors do not make claims on the 
interests of others. In a similar vein there is no collective action involved since applying 
for a driver’s license is not usually anything done by a group with collective goals but by 
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individuals (Ibid.). When you combine the three components, we find episodes that can 
be placed under the rubric of contentious politics. 
This definition of contentious politics is a fairly apt description of the events that 
have been described in the introduction and literature review. In this study, I am not 
interested in the acts of individuals when they act in relation to the government as single 
individuals. The phenomena which I choose to place my focus on are the acts of 
individuals in various groups who choose to make demands upon political actors in a 
visible manner, for example through protest. Whether these groups have a formal or 
informal structure is therefore left aside for the purpose of this study. To be explicit, I 
focus on how the internet affects contentious episodes and their diffusion across national 
borders. Consider a theoretical scenario in which Group A decides to stage protests in 
country A. After witnessing these protests, Group B in Country B decides to organize 
protests of their own against their government or other organizations within their own 
country. In this scenario, events that take place outside the arena of domestic politics will 
still have on impact on the political stability and events within Country B. Some 
observers believe that this is the story behind the Arab Spring and the diffusion of 
protests across countries in Northern Africa and the Middle East. Another way through 
which it is possible to visualize the term ‘contentious politics’ is by substituting it with 
‘political conflict’. Political conflict can appear both in nonviolent forms, such as 
peaceful protest, or violent forms, such as revolutions or civil wars. I use the two terms 
interchangeably.  
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If we assume that events such as the various protests found in the Arab Spring are 
connected, then we are required to formulate a causal explanation for why this diffusion 
might take place.  
The Demonstration Effect 
One possible explanation has been described as the “demonstration effect” (Kuran 
1998). When events happen in one country, news and information regarding those events 
will be dispersed across the world by various methods (mainly television, radio, 
newspapers, and the internet). Thus, citizens of one country might be able to receive 
information of developments in another country that they can apply to their own 
situation. One example of a type of demonstration effect can be found in the scholarly 
work on democratization. Linz and Stepan (1996) argue that individuals reflect upon 
previous events and apply them to their own situation. They argue, for example, that the 
Portuguese revolution strongly influenced conservative politicians in Spain who had no 
intention of suffering the same fate as their counterparts in Portugal. Likewise, Prince 
Juan Carlos of Spain is likely to have been influenced by developments in Greece where 
his brother-in-law lost the throne due to his ambivalence toward democracy (Linz and 
Stepan 1996, p. 76). These examples seem to indicate that people indeed learn from what 
happens in other countries and that they also can apply those lessons to their own 
situation. However, Linz and Stepan did not have as their primary goal to investigate the 
process through which individuals in Portugal and Spain learned from each other and 
therefore barely touched upon the subject. 
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In order for a diffusion to take place, it seems reasonable to assume that 
something like a demonstration effect has to take place. Central to this effect is the ability 
of citizens in different countries to actually obtain information about events in other 
countries. In the past, information diffused through travelers, merchants, and newspapers. 
In more recent times people started to obtain information thanks to technological 
advancements such as the telegraph, the radio, and television. Today, modern 
communications such as the internet allow people to obtain information at will, at any 
time. For example, citizens of one country are able to turn on their computer and bring up 
their web browser after which they are presented with a mountain of news items, blog 
posts, and social media that can provide them with information about the world around 
them. The internet also allows its users to stay in contact with large numbers of people 
across large geographical distances, something that was largely absent in past 
technological advancements. Modern communications and transportation technologies 
have managed to compress time and space, making our world much more tightly 
connected than in the past. It is therefore reasonable to assume that a demonstration effect 
is likely to take place between countries in the world today. The question is whether the 
demonstration effect has a significant impact on the diffusion of contentious episodes, 
and more specifically, what role does the internet play in this? With this background, the 
research question is stated as follows: 
What is the effect of the internet on the diffusion of contentious episodes across 
national borders? 
I here present a theoretical framework which provides an argument as to why we 
might expect that the internet will contribute to the diffusion of contentious episodes 
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across national borders. This argument will largely fit the conventional wisdom that was 
promoted by the media around the Arab Spring where they placed an emphasis on the 
importance of modern communications technologies. 
The internet and diffusion of contentious episodes 
The argument in support of the internet as a contributing factor for the diffusion 
of political conflict has a number of different parts: 1) the internet reduces time 
constraints and 2) to reduce the cost of communicating with others as well as the cost of 
obtaining information (Lupia and Sin 2003; Wellman 2001). Let us take a closer look at 
these two, arguably related, but still separate components. First, the internet has the 
potential to reduce time constraints which not only will allow information to travel faster 
within countries, but also between countries. In the context of the demonstration effect, 
this means that information will be able to travel faster across borders. In the past, the 
diffusion of information itself used to take a considerable amount of time. Just within the 
United States news could take several days to travel from Washington D.C to 
Philadelphia, whereas today information can travel within seconds between California 
and New York with the help of a mouse-click. The effect of faster diffusion of news 
across large areas allows citizens to take part of news within a relatively short time of the 
events occurring. A person who is thinking about engaging in contentious politics is more 
likely to be prompted to do so by events that have taken place fairly recently. Reading 
about events that took place the same day or week should be vastly different from reading 
about events that took place a year or more ago. ‘Fresh’ news tend to be more exciting 
than old and people can view them as being more relevant to their own situation. 
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Because of the above, contentious episodes should be able to spread quicker over 
vast geographical areas, creating a momentum that will sustain the contentious episodes. 
Episodes that manage to gain some form of momentum is likely to have a greater 
probability to continue dispersing across vast areas when people get swept up in a, with a 
lack of a better term, ‘revolutionary’ mood. The internet should also make it is easier to 
organize large clusters of protesters in a short amount of time since it has the capacity of 
reaching out to a larger number faster than other forms of communication. 
Consider the example of the Arab Spring. Citizens in other North African and 
Middle Eastern countries were able to go online with in order to watch the protests in 
Tunisia and Egypt take place in real time through streaming services on the internet. 
While it also should be recognized that cable news channels and other forms of media 
can provide citizens with the same type of information, one important difference persists. 
When it comes to cable news channels, for example Al Jazeera, the viewers are at the 
mercy of the editors and owners of the cable news channels for what information they 
will be able to access. When individuals go online, they are able to choose their 
information more freely and without the influence of cable news channels. When 
receiving information online it is possible for individuals to choose what type of 
information they want to receive. It is also possible the get this information instantly from 
blogs, streaming news, forums, and other channels of communication with friends who 
are involved in the protests.  
While the internet reduces time constraints and disperses information faster over 
vast geographical areas, it also reduces communication costs for individuals and allows 
for access to multiple sources of information. The internet provides individuals with 
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access to a host of different news sources, chat rooms, communities, and various types of 
social media for a relatively cheap cost. Especially in developed countries it is becoming 
more common that individuals have access to the internet and that they use this access in 
order to stay in touch with friends  and to receive news and to meet new people (Dutton 
et al 2005). One effect stemming from this fact and that can be found in the literature, is 
the belief that the internet can function as a facilitator of civic participation. Scholars 
have found empirical evidence for a civic participation theory (See for example Shah et al 
2005). When civic participation increases, it also indicates that people will be more 
susceptible to participation in contentious events and that they actively will seek out, 
either offline or online, information regarding ways to become engaged. Movements such 
as Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party Movement used the internet in order to get out 
the message and organize contentious episodes across the United States. On Twitter and 
Facebook, both movements reached out and attempted to engage individuals who 
otherwise might not ever have heard about the issues that these different groups worked 
for or against. 
Since the internet makes it cheaper to stay in contact with friends and 
acquaintances, it also provides a channel for individuals to maintain long distance 
relationships (Walgrave et al 2011). When individuals can stay in touch with a more 
dispersed network of friends they will also be able to receive first-hand information from 
other countries. For example, if a contentious episode takes place in Athens, Greece, it is 
today more likely that individuals in other countries, such as Portugal, can receive first-
hand information about the episode in Greece, ask personal questions, and thus relate the 
events to their own situation. This might either take place through personal friends or 
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through online forums and communities. Contrast this scenario to the passive act of just 
watching the evening news broadcaster read the news and report on current events. The 
two scenarios are likely to produces different experiences for those who take part in 
them. This sets the internet apart from other communications technologies such as the 
telephone, in which you only can talk to one person at a time, and news media such as 
television. The argument that there is something specific about the internet that affect the 
way in which actors organize contentious episodes is nothing new. This argument has 
been promoted by scholars within the research field of contentious politics in the past 
(See for example Tilly 2004). However, while other communication technologies also 
allowed for long-distance ties, the internet can be argued to provide a new form of 
communication where people now are able to remain in contact with multiple individuals 
(Wellman et al 2003) through a host of different methods. It is today possible for 
someone in Africa to stay in touch with someone in North America through email, social 
media, direct messaging, and other methods. The internet, through services like Skype, 
also makes it cheaper to make calls to other individuals dispersed around the world. 
These different factors all seem to combine in making the internet a relevant 
factor for diffusion of contentious episodes through its potential for enhancing the 
demonstration effect. The internet allows for a faster dispersion of information while also 
providing this information, and interpersonal ties, for a relatively cheap cost. Note how 
this argument is not based on the existence of transnational organizations and instead 
builds on individual access to information and individual ties across nations, setting this 
argument apart from the previous literature.  
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Why do people protest? 
The argument that has been presented above provides a story for how the internet 
contributes to a demonstration effect, creates ties between individuals, and how it quickly 
disperses information across large geographical distances. But the question of why that at 
all matters has still not been adequately answered. Why would the above lead to a 
diffusion of contentious events such as protests? In order to answer this question, I will 
now turn my attention to the part of the literature that attempts to provide reasons for why 
people choose to participate in contentious events such as protests, demonstrations, and 
revolutions. 
Rational choice scholars such as Opp and Kittel (2010) argue that the action of 
political protest is dependent upon a number of different factors, of which one is political 
discontent. Based on the original theory of collective action (Olson 1965), political 
discontent does not lead to protest because single individuals will not be able to influence 
the effect of a protest or its outcome. Thus, protest should be highly unlikely. However, 
several scholars have argued that when individuals become aware of the fact that they can 
join together with others in large groups they will start to perceive their influence on the 
political process as higher than zero (Muller and Opp 1986; Opp and Kittel 2010). It 
might also be the case that individuals decide to contribute to the common cause because 
they feel obliged to do so by moral and social incentives (Opp 1989). When an individual 
see that other individuals are out protesting and participating in various forms of 
contentious politics, for example against an oppressive government, that might lead them 
to feel obliged to participate. Consider this in the context of the discussion of the internet 
that was conducted earlier. The internet provides individuals with a window through 
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which they can see that they are not alone in holding their specific beliefs and attitudes. 
In fact, the internet can enable them to connect with a larger group and to become more 
inclined to participate in contentious episodes.  
Other scholars have focused on deprivation and grievances (Gurr 1970; Turner 
and Killian 1972; Smelser 1963). What these scholars have in common is that they all 
posit a strong relationship between grievances, or deprivation, and the emergence of 
social movements that engage in contentious action. These scholars thus focus upon what 
might be best labeled as mass psychology in order to explain why groups choose to 
engage in collective action.  While it is likely that latent grievances always exist, it is also 
true that we do not always see political protest. Therefore, an issue that still is up for 
debate in the scholarly community is the different factors that have to exist in order for 
grievances to actually transition into collective action. Again, the internet can provide us 
with a partial explanation of this issue. Through internet access, citizens from around the 
world will be able to gather information on what is going on in other countries. One type 
of information that they will be able to receive is how protests and other forms of 
contentious episodes in other countries improve the standard of living and create 
freedoms for those people. Through that information, people might decide that they, too, 
want to improve their own situation and that engaging in collective action can be one way 
through which they can achieve it.. This might for example be the case in the Arab Spring 
where the population of Egypt saw the Tunisians overthrow their government in order to 
improve their situation. The Egyptians then promptly decided to follow suit in order to 
reap the same rewards as the Tunisian population. However, it is also possible to make 
the argument that the internet can contribute to a decrease in collective action and 
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protests. If people receive news that informs them of how protests and revolutions in 
other countries have failed to overthrow their government, or in other ways proved 
unsuccessful, it is possible that people simply will decide that it is not worth engaging in 
collective action since they are likely to fail anyway. 
The goal with this study is however not to verify or falsify theories about 
individual rebellious behavior and collective action. The theories that have been briefly 
discussed above are merely meant to illustrate that there are plausible theoretical 
explanations as to why the internet might prompt individuals to participate in contentious 
episodes. So while the issue of why people choose to protest is relevant and fascinating, it 
is not within the scope of this study to provide an answer to that question. Instead, I aim 
to provide one piece to a larger puzzle of the factors that affect how protests diffuse 
between different sites. I will now turn my attention to a set of hypotheses that will be 
tested in the empirical section of the paper.  
Hypothesis 1: Countries with a large number of internet users will be vulnerable 
to the diffusion of contentious episodes from other countries 
The prediction that this hypothesis provides is fairly straightforward and based on 
the previous discussion. When a country has a large number of citizens that are connected 
to the internet, the probability of contentious episodes diffusing to that country from other 
places around the globe should increase. I would here like to address a criticism that 
already exists within the literature. Tilly (2004) expresses doubts about the possibility of 
the internet to significantly alter the way in which contentious episodes are created. 
Rheingold (2003) concludes that the ability to access modern technology, in the form of 
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the internet and cellular technology played a critical part in the removal of President 
Ferdinand Marcos from power in the Philippines. Tilly (2004) instead argues that the 
existence of modern technology and online communities did not fundamentally change 
the process through which the protests diffused within the Philippines. Instead, they 
merely enhanced mechanisms already exhibited by previous technologies. This is a valid 
criticism of the idea that the internet fundamentally transforms the way in which 
contentious episodes diffuse. However, the theory is not that the internet fundamentally 
transforms the diffusion of contentious episodes. I am merely arguing that it enhances the 
demonstration effect, while perhaps doing that to a greater extent than previous 
technologies have been able to. 
The relationship between the internet and diffusion that is posited in the first 
hypotheses might however be too simple; therefore I also introduce a number of 
additional hypotheses below that include other factors which also are likely to affect the 
diffusion of contentious episodes.  
First, we need to consider that different forms of contentious performances and 
repertoires exist in different sites. One type of contention that is natural in one country 
does not necessarily have to be natural to citizens of another country on the other side of 
the globe (Tarrow and Tilly 2007, p.11).  Contentious performances are the familiar and 
standardized ways in which political actors make collective claims on some other set of 
political actors. Performances evolve over time and are different from place to place. For 
example, Thomas Clarkson and his anti-slavery activists started the tactic of sending in 
mass petitions to the government listing their demands. Petitioning itself was not 
anything new, but the way in which Clarkson and his collaborators used it was 
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completely new for collective claim making (Tarrow and Tilly 2007, p.12). While one 
type of performance is frequently used in a country it doesn’t necessarily need to be used 
in another (Tarrow and Tilly 2007, p. 16-21). For example, the performances that are 
being conducted in the United States are likely to differ widely from the performances 
that are conducted in China. While the reasons for this might be numerous, chief among 
them is the difference in rights granted to the citizens by their respective government. 
While Americans retain the rights to peaceful assembly and to petition politicians the 
Chinese population lacks this right. Certain performances that are allowed in one country 
can be banned in another, making it difficult for individuals to apply the lessons learned 
from other countries to their own situation.   
However, not all countries are dissimilar in their repertoires. The repertoires 
exhibited by Canadians and Americans tend to be largely similar even though they are 
two different countries. Geographically proximate countries, like the United States and 
Canada, are more likely to share the same repertoire than two countries that are far apart. 
This provides the ground for our second hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: Countries with a large number of internet users will be vulnerable 
to the diffusion of contentious episodes from geographically proximate countries  
The example of the United States and China also touched upon the issue of 
regime type, something that is commonly referred to within previous literature. For 
example, Tilly (2004) urges us to look at the political structure within a country in order 
to predict whether contentious episodes will arise or not. Depending on the political 
structure, opportunities to engage in contentious action might vary between countries. 
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Tarrow and Tilly (2007) argue that it is more likely that contentious episodes will take 
place in democracies where the political opportunity structure provides ample 
opportunity for citizens to engage in political activism. In highly autocratic states where 
the government has the capacity to oppress the people opportunities for political action 
will be lower than in a democracy. Tarrow and Tilly (2007) do not address or test 
relevance of this argument in relation to modern communication technologies. In line 
with these authors, I assume that it is likely that the internet will be more effective to 
diffuse contention to democracies than it is to diffuse contention to non-democracies. The 
reason is fairly straightforward: authoritarian governments are able to censor and 
moderate access to information in a way that democratic governments cannot, or 
generally choose not. Governments in states like Iran and China have been shown to 
quickly adapt to the age of modern communications and have developed methods through 
which they can filter, or edit, information that they don’t believe that the masses should 
be aware of. So even though political conflicts might arise abroad that has the potential to 
spark political conflicts in other countries, it is less likely to do so if those countries are 
non-democratic. This is due to the control of information that autocratic leaders are able 
to exercise within their states.  From this two additional hypotheses follow: 
Hypotheses 3: Contentious episodes are more likely to diffuse to democratic 
countries than to non-democratic countries. 
Earlier I engaged in a discussion of the various events that are included in the 
term ‘contentious politics’. I include different types of contentious episodes ranging from 
peaceful political protests to full-blown civil wars. However, is it reasonable to expect 
that the internet will affect the diffusion of these types of events equally, or will the 
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internet be more likely to influence certain types of contentious episodes? To put in 
another way: would a political demonstration arranged by a domestic group, such as the 
National Rifle Association, inside the United States diffuse across national borders and 
create protest in other countries to the same extent as, admittedly unlikely, presence of a 
civil war within the United States?  Even though both of the hypothetical scenarios 
qualify as contentious episodes, I would here like to argue that the diffusion of peaceful 
and violent contentious episodes should exhibit different patterns.  
Again, my argument is fairly straightforward: political protests, such as peaceful 
demonstrations and marches, are more likely to diffuse across national borders via a 
demonstration effect than more violent episodes such as civil wars. In order to support 
this argument I borrow from the rational choice school of thought. When individuals are 
faced with the decision to either stay home or take part in contentious collective action a 
rational decision will take place in which the benefits and costs of participating are 
compared with the costs and benefits of remaining inactive. Under conventional 
assumptions, engaging in contentious behavior will be fairly costly, especially when we 
consider rebellious behavior (See for example Salert 1976; Muller and Opp 1986). The 
benefits of participation in a violent uprising have to outweigh the costs in order for 
individuals to engage in them. However, it is also likely that it is less costly, and thus 
easier, to participate in contentious politics when the costs are low. This might be the 
case when it comes to peaceful political protests. Many of the participants in these forms 
of events only have to show up in order to show their support and their costs might be 
minimized to an hour of their day. Contrast this to more violent episodes where there 
might be a danger of severe physical harm and strict repercussions. In non-democratic 
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states, governments might have the capacity to punish individuals who not only 
participate in violent forms of contentious politics, but also those who participate in 
peaceful protest. 
For the diffusion of contentious politics I expect that the logic above will have 
one main effect. I expect that diffusion is more likely to occur in cases of nonviolent 
protests. Individuals who receive information regarding contentious episodes in other 
countries through the demonstration effect will be more likely to engage in nonviolent 
forms of contentious politics because it simply is cheaper than to engage in violent forms. 
I also expect that the internet will have a greater effect on the spread of peaceful forms of 
contentious politics than on violent forms. I argue that this is the case because it should 
be harder to convey the benefits of engaging in political conflict through the internet than 
it would be in person. The intensity and passion that can be conveyed at some form of 
meeting, for example a rally, is higher than what you can transmit through a computer or 
a mobile device. Scholars such as Bennett (2003) argue that online relationships alone 
aren’t enough to maintain interpersonal relationships and that offline interaction is 
especially important in order to build strong ties between people. Therefore, I don’t 
expect the internet to be able to convey the necessity for violent political conflict in a way 
that will overcome the perceived costs associated with it. This leads to the fifth, and last, 
hypothesis that will be tested in this study: 
Hypothesis 4: Contentious episodes that are peaceful in nature are more likely to 
be triggered by a high number of internet users than violent contentious episodes. 
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The argument that has been forwarded in these pages is fairly simple. I expect that 
a large number of internet users in one country will be correlated with an increase in 
contentious politics. The hypotheses that have been presented above provide us with 
testable propositions that we can examine. I will now move on to the research design 
which describes the way in which the empirical test will take place.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Introduction 
The empirical test of the hypotheses introduced in the theory section is conducted 
through statistical analysis of quantitative data. Because of the nature of the dependent 
variable, a count, a Negative Binominal Regression will be used. The empirical analysis 
will allow us to falsify, or confirm, the hypotheses that have been presented earlier. 
However, it is worth keeping in mind that the results of the empirical analysis in no way 
represent the final say on whether the internet affects the diffusion of contentious politics 
across national borders. Instead, this project should be viewed as one of the first 
comprehensive attempts to uncover the causal relationship between the internet and 
protest in the modern world. The purpose of the research design is to clearly lay out the 
way in which the statistical analysis will be conducted and the conceptualization of the 
different variables that will be tested. The research design section of the thesis will 
proceed as follows. First, I will continue the discussion regarding the unit of analysis that 
was introduced earlier in earlier pages. Second, I will engage in a discussion and 
conceptualization of the dependent variable within this paper. Third, the independent 
variable will be discussed. Fourth, the various controls variables that also are theorized to 
affect the diffusion of contentious politics will be surveyed and included in the analysis.  
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Unit of Analysis 
The explicit purpose of this paper is to investigate how the internet affects a 
country’s vulnerability to protests that take place abroad. Do a high number of internet 
users make protests more or less likely when protests take place in other states? Because 
this project has this purpose, and in structured in a cross sectional time series dataset, the 
natural unit of analysis is defined as the country-year. For example, Germany in 1994 is 
counted as one observation while Germany in 1995 is counted as another observation. 
This decision places some limitations on the scope of this project that are worth pointing 
out here. For example, while the individual motivations of people engaging in 
contentious politics are worthwhile topics of study it is not a primary goal of this project 
to evaluate different claims that have been made about individual motivations for 
engaging in contentious politics. Evaluating individual motivations to engage in 
contentious politics would require the study to take mix levels of analysis, in this case 
individual and state levels of analysis. The decision to not take into account individual 
levels of analysis is based on two fairly straightforward reasons. First, it is my goal to 
keep the statistical analysis as simple and clear as possible. Therefore, the decision has 
been made to only focus on country level variables. Second, the paper aims to investigate 
the general relationship between the internet and diffusion of contentious politics. 
However, the available data is best described as scarce and the data that is used in this 
paper is only focused on the country level analysis. Collecting individual level data 
would require extensive data gathering that is outside the scope of this project. 
It will however note that motivations for engaging in contentious politics in no 
way are irrelevant for this subject and that the assumptions that have been made in this 
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study do not exist in a vacuum. If a statistically significant relationship is suggested to 
exist between the internet and contentious politics future research should conduct a closer 
examination of why this is. That one plausible explanation has been introduced in this 
project does by no means mean that other explanations do not exist.   
Time Period 
The study spans the years between 1990 and 2005. This is partly due to data 
limitations, and partly due to the limited spread of the internet before 1990. The starting 
point is determined based on the observation that the internet had a fairly limited spread 
before 1990. Therefore, it is not very likely that the internet played any noticeable role in 
the 1980s or earlier. The end date, 2005, is chosen because of data limitations. 
Dependent Variables 
First, it should be noted that contentious politics is a fairly broad term that can 
cover many different types of events. In order to conceptualize contentious politics in this 
paper I choose to define it as those protest events where people gather in order to direct 
their claims at governments. This conceptualization can still include a host of different 
types of events. For example, I am able to include riots, anti-government demonstrations, 
as well as other types of violent and nonviolent events.  The theory section hypothesized 
that different mechanisms might be at place for violent and nonviolent contentious 
episodes. Because of this, the possibility of separating events into violent and nonviolent 
is a priority. It is also desirable that the dependent variable capture the number of protest 
events within a country instead of simply noting whether a contentious episode takes 
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place or not.  These are the criteria that have been taken into consideration during the 
selection of an appropriate dataset.  
One dataset that contains all of the appropriate characteristics described above is 
the Murdie and Bashin (2011) dataset. Between 1991 and 2005 this dataset identifies over 
70 000 protest events, 50 000 violent and 20 000 nonviolent protest. These events were 
identified by relying on the IDEA framework which bases its observations on daily 
events reported through Reuters Global News Service. I choose to use this dataset 
because it has a number of important strengths that raise our confidence in this dataset. 
First, because this dataset has considerable global reach which increases the chances of 
observing protest events around the globe
1
. Second, this dataset does not set an arbitrary 
threshold for when events should be included or not. Because the dataset does not use an 
arbitrary threshold, which might produce a selection effect, it includes a remarkable 
number of over 70 000 protest events across the globe. Third, this dataset also includes a 
degree of disaggregation of the different variables that is not generally found in other 
datasets dealing with protests.  
The dataset is based on counts of contentious episodes based on the 
aforementioned Reuters Global News Service. For example, if one (1) contentious 
episode occurred in India during the year 2002 that is coded as a one (1) for that year. If 
two (2) contentious episodes occurred that would instead be coded as a two (2). These 
contentious episodes are further disaggregated into two subcategories: violent and 
nonviolent episodes. Based on the theory-section, this disaggregation is necessary in 
                                                          
1 Reuters Global News Service has offices in over 200 different locations across 
the globe which makes it a fairly reliable provider of news reports from all over the 
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order to test whether the internet affects the diffusion of nonviolent and violent 
contentious episodes differently. 
Independent Variables 
Recall that the theory and hypotheses state that the number of internet users will 
be correlated to the spread of contentious politics between states. Thus, the independent 
variable should therefore capture the number of internet users in a country. The data for 
the independent variable is extracted from the World Bank and their dataset, named 
World Development Indicators (WDI). Specifically, the measure for “Internet Users (per 
100 people)” is extracted from WDI in order to measure the number of people with 
internet access within a country. This measurement, since it is proportional, accounts for 
the size of the size of the population and is comparable cross-nationally. This provides a 
significant advantage over true number measurements. Consider the following example.  
In the United States, 10 million internet users would be a small minority of the entire 
population which is over 300 million. In Sweden, 10 million internet users would include 
the entire Swedish population. The example shows that 10 million internet users in one 
country will not necessarily be the same as 10 million internet users in another. A 
measurement that takes into account the level of internet usage in relation to the size of 
the general population is better suited for this project and the variable that has been 
extracted from the WDI meets these requirements. 
The Main Statistical Model 
A number of different models will be used in order to investigate our various 
hypotheses. The main model, which the other analyses will be based on, is provided 
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below together with an explanation of the various control variables that are included in 
the study. 
PROTEST = B0 + B1 INTERNETUSERS + B2 PROXPROTEST + B3 
LAGPROTEST + B4 POLITY2 + B5 GDPCAPITA + B6 UNEMPLOYMENT + 
B7 POPULATION + B8 URBANPOPULATION 
In this model, domestic protest appears as the dependent variable and internet 
users have been inserted as the main independent variable. The protest variable is 
extracted from Murdie and Bashin (2011) and the internet data is extracted from the 
World Bank’s Development Indicators. Both of these variables have received extensive 
discussion above, and I therefore now shift my attention to a discussion of the various 
control variables that are specified in the above model.  
First, it is possible that contentious episodes are more likely to diffuse among 
countries that are geographically proximate. In the Arab Spring, protests against the 
regime started in Tunisia and spread to other countries that are geographically proximate 
in North Africa and the Middle East. Within the literature on civil war, studies have 
previously found that countries that are located in regions suffering from civil war have a 
heightened risk of experiencing detrimental effects to their own public health and 
economic growth (For example, see Murdoch and Sandler 2004). In order to account for 
this I exclude all observations where countries do not have geographically proximate 
protests taking place. Two countries are considered proximate if the distance between the 
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capitals of the two countries is 400 miles or less. This distance is chosen in order to adopt 
conventional measurements already existing in the literature
2
.  
LAGPROTEST attempts to capture the history and tradition of contentious 
politics within a country. If a country has experienced a large number of protests in the 
past, for example within the past 12 months, the population might have included public 
demonstrations and contention in their repertoire of contentious politics. It then follows 
that if public protest is included in the repertoire that a population is more likely to use it 
in order to voice their opinions (Tarrow and Tilly, 2007). LAGPROTEST attempts to 
capture this by accounting for the number of contentious episodes within a country in the 
previous year. In the statistical analysis, TOTALPROTEST is lagged in order to create 
LAGPROTEST. 
The next variable, POLITY2, accounts for the level of democracy and autocracy 
within a country and is extracted via the EUGene Software. The Polity data in EUGene is 
based on the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al 2010). The dataset contains measurements 
for the level of democracy and autocracy for each state between 1800 and 2010. 
Democracy and autocracy are both scored on a scale from -10 to +10 and a composite 
measurement is created by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score in 
the dataset. Thus, a higher polity score indicates a higher level of democracy in the state. 
Another factor possessing the ability to affect the emergence of contentious 
episodes is the standard of living within a state. It might be the case that an affluent 
population isn’t very likely to take to the streets in order to protest against the 
                                                          
2
 400 miles is the longest distance found in the Direct Contiguity dataset that is included in the Correlates 
of War Project (Stinnett et al 2002) 
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government. Meanwhile, a population that is experiencing economic hardship will be 
more likely to engage in contentious politics in order to improve their own situation. 
Therefore, I include a GDP per capita measurement in the study. The GDP data is 
extracted from Gleditsch (2002) and labeled as GDPCAPITA. The natural logarithm of 
the variable is used in the statistical analysis. A related measure for the standard of living 
and economic hardship within a country can be the level of unemployment. A control 
variable labeled UNEMPLOYMENT is therefore introduced based on data from the 
World Bank. 
States with a larger population are more likely to experience a higher number of 
protest events compared to states with a smaller population. If there are more people 
within a country there will be a greater opportunity to form groups that can engage in 
collective action. Therefore, the variable POPULATION is included in the model. The 
data is extracted from the National Material Capabilities Data, which is a part of the 
Correlates of War Project (Singer et al 1972). In the statistical analysis, the natural 
logarithm of the POPULATION variable is used. Anecdotal evidence from the Arab 
Spring and other protests also suggests that protests might be more likely in urban areas. 
Therefore I include a variable labeled URBANPOPULATION in order to account for 
large urban populations. The urban population data is also retrieved from the National 
Material Capabilities Data after which the variable is created by taking the urban 
population of a country over the total population in order to create a proportional 
measurement. 
While the internet has a potential to contribute to the diffusion of contentious 
episodes, hypothesis four argued that the effect will be different for violent and 
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nonviolent episodes. Arguably, the risks associated with participation in peaceful 
demonstrations are lower than those associated with participation in a revolution against a 
government. Therefore, the dependent variable is separated into two parts for a test of the 
fourth hypothesis: violent and nonviolent protest. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
RESULTS 
The main model was tested using data from Murdie and Bashin (2011). In short 
the results do not find robust support for the hypothesized relationship between the 
number of internet users and the number of contentious episodes within a country. 
Table 1 – All Protests 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES All Protests Geographically 
Proximate 
   
INTERNETUSERS -0.007*** -0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
PROXIMATEPROTEST 0.001***  
 (0.000)  
LAGPROTEST 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
POLITY2 0.001 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
logGDPCAPITA 0.358*** 0.389*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
logPOPULATION 0.466*** 0.465*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
URBANPOPP 0.207** 0.214** 
 (0.069) (0.070) 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.035 0.033*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -5.577*** -5.706*** 
 (0.269) (0.270) 
   
Observations 2,482 2,463 
Pseudo. R-squared 0.164 0.162 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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After dropping observations due to gaps in the data the primary model is left with 2482 
country-year observations and the second model with 2463 observations. The analysis was 
performed using a Negative Binomial Regression (nbreg in STATA). The following discussion 
will discuss the results in relation to the four different hypotheses, starting with hypothesis 1. 
The first hypothesis posited a positive correlation between the number of internet users 
within a country and the diffusion of contentious episodes. Using the Murdie and Bashin (2011) 
protest data the empirical analysis displays a negative relationship between political protest and 
the level of internet users. This model includes all countries, regardless of whether they had a 
geographically proximate country that experienced protest or not. This finding is statistically 
significant at the 0.001 level. The first hypothesis cannot be said to receive any empirical support 
from the analysis provided by the first model. In the second model, I dropped those countries that 
lack geographically proximate protests. This brought the total number of observations down to 
2463. Again, the internet appears to have a negative effect on the likelihood of protest. These 
results do not provide support for the hypothesized relationship introduced in the theory section. 
In fact, these results provide indicate that the conventional perception of the internet and its effect 
on contentious politics is dubious at best, and completely wrong at worst. 
For the second hypothesis the second model provides us with some insight. For those 
countries that have geographically proximate protests outside their borders, the internet displays a 
statistically significant and negative correlation to the number of protests. This finding is 
statistically significant at the 0.001 level. For the second hypothesis, this finding is problematic 
since it posited that the internet would have a greater potential to influence the diffusion of 
geographically proximate protests.  
Both models indicate that a history of protest is positively correlated to the presence of 
contentious episodes within a country in any given year, in line with that we would expect. For 
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both models, this relationship is found to be statistically significant at the 0.001 level. This 
indicates that a tradition of engaging in contentious episodes is an important factor for 
determining whether people will decide to engage in contentious episodes in the future. While 
this control variable isn’t included in any of the hypotheses that have been specified above, it 
conforms broadly with the discussion by Tarrow and Tilly (2007). Tarrow and Tilly argue that a 
history of contentious episodes and repertoires is a main contributing factor to the incidence of 
political protest.  
As for the third hypothesis, it is not obvious from the empirical result if we should reject 
or accept the hypothesis. Model 1 indicates that an increase in democracy is correlated with an 
increase in protest, just as hypothesis 3 predicted. This finding is not statistically significant.  In 
the second model a negative correlation exists between the level of democracy and the level of 
political protest. Again, this finding is not statistically significant and no clear relationship can be 
determined from these two models.  
Something should also be said about the remaining control variables. Two variables were 
included in order to account for economic conditions and hardship within a country: 
unemployment and GDP per capita. The unemployment variable produced the expected result in 
both of the models. When unemployment is high it appears like the population is more willing to 
engage in contentious episodes such as protest. While this finding only remains statistically 
significant in one of the two models, the correlation still exhibits the same sign in both models. 
When unemployment is high, it might be the case that grievances against the government grows 
and creates fruitful ground for contentious episodes to take place. When using GDP per capita as 
a measurement for prosperity and economic conditions the relationship that is displayed by both 
models show a positive and statistically significant relationship.  As GDP per capita increases, so 
does the number of contentious episodes. This surprising finding speaks against the hypothesized 
relationship that I introduced earlier in the theory section.  Furthermore, I find the expected 
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relationship between population and protest, as well as between urban population and protest. 
These findings are statistically significant in both models. Countries with larger populations are 
more likely to experience protest events than less populous nations. Likewise, countries where a 
larger proportion of the population lives in urban areas are more likely to experience political 
protest than those with a more rural population. The result, then, exhibits the expected 
relationship that was posited in the research design. That the finding is statistically significant and 
holds across both models gives us reason to assume that this relationship is robust and that it 
would show up in other studies as well. 
Table 2 – Violent Protests 
 (3) (4) 
VARIABLES All Observations Limited 
Observations 
   
INTERNETUSERS -0.004** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
PROXPROTEST 0.001***  
 (0.000)  
LAGPROTEST 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
POLITY2 -0.006 -0.010* 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
logGDPCAPITA 0.233*** 0.255*** 
 (0.032) (0.031) 
logPOPULATION 0.430*** 0.426*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
URBANPOPP 0.357*** 0.359*** 
 (0.092) (0.093) 
TOTALUNEMPLOYMENT 0.041*** 0.040*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant -4.748*** -4.794*** 
 (0.341) (0.342) 
   
Observations 2,482 2,463 
Pseudo. R-squared 0.145 0.143 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
I make a slight alteration to the dependent variable in order to test the fourth hypothesis. 
Instead of including a general protest-variable on the left-hand side of the equation I split it into 
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one violent and one nonviolent variable. These two variables are then tested with the help of four 
separate models. Models 3 and 4 use violent protests as their dependent variables while models 5 
and 6 use peaceful protests as their dependent variables. The analysis is conducted with Negative 
Binominal Regression (nbreg in STATA). This is most appropriate approach to statistical analysis 
of this data since the dependent variable is a count of protest events. 
Model 3 includes all observations in the dataset, regardless of whether the 
countries in question have geographically proximate taking place in neighboring states. 
Model 4 only includes those observations where countries have protests taking place in 
their near abroad. First, when analyzing violent protests, it should be noted that the 
number of internet users is found to not have a positive effect on the level of protests 
within a country. As in the models that used a single category as a measure for protests, I 
find a negative relationship between the number of internet usage and protest. In both 
models, this relationship is statistically significant. It thus seems like the results from the 
first two models also hold when only violent protests are included in the dependent 
variable. For the second hypothesis, these two models provide further evidence against it. 
When violent protests are used as the dependent variable the results how that proximate 
protests seem to have a significant effect. This effect does however appear to be 
negatively correlated with the incidence of protest. Earlier results from models 1 and 2 
thus receive further validity through these two models.  
 
The third hypothesis receives no support from either model 3 or model 4. In 
model 3, there is a negative relationship between the level of democracy and the number 
of contentious episodes that takes place within a country.  This finding is not statistically 
significant. However, model 4 also shows a negative correlation between a higher level 
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of democracy and violent contentious episodes. In this case, the finding is statistically 
significant. Considering these results, it is hard to claim that there is much, if any, 
empirical support for the third hypothesis.  
 
As in the first two models, models 3 and 4 find that a history of protest within a 
country significantly increases the probability of protest in any given year. This finding is 
robust across both models at the 0.001 level. The remaining control variables produce 
results that are in line with the previous models. Again, it seems like an increase in GDP 
per capita is positively correlated with an increase in the number of contentious episodes 
that take place within a country. This finding confirms the results from the previous 
models. Both population variables exhibit a positive, and statistically significant, 
relationship with the dependent variable. The unemployment variable also produces the 
expected result with a high level of unemployment being correlated with an increase in 
protests. 
 
I will now turn to the results from the models that examined nonviolent protests 
(See below). As in the discussion about violent protests, I will turn first to hypotheses 1 
through 3 before I turn my attention to hypothesis 4. For nonviolent protests, the 
relationship between the number of internet users and protests again turn out to be 
problematic for the first hypothesis in the study. Both the fifth and sixth models display a 
negative relationship between internet users and protest, with both models exhibiting a 
statistical significance at the 0.001 level. The number of internet users does not appear to 
have a positive relationship with protest and this finding is consistent for both violent and 
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nonviolent protest. Every model that has been presented so far has found a negative 
relationship between the number of internet users and protests.  
Table 3 – Nonviolent Protest 
 (6) (6) 
VARIABLES All Observations Limited Sample 
   
INTERNETUSERS -0.013*** -0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
PROXPROTEST 0.001***  
 (0.000)  
LAGPROTEST 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
POLITY2 0.015*** 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
logGDPCAPITA 0.578*** 0.612*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) 
logPOPULATION 0.532*** 0.541*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
URBANPOPP 0.022 0.023 
 (0.047) (0.048) 
TOTALUNEMPLOYMENT 0.018*** 0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant -8.871*** -9.113*** 
 (0.291) (0.289) 
   
Observations 2,482 2,463 
Pseudo. R-squared 0.193 0.191 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
In relation to the third hypothesis these two models combined produce interesting 
results. In both of these models, the level of democracy is positively correlated with 
peaceful political protest. This result is both stable and statistically significant across both 
models. This finding is consistent with the theoretical framework of ‘political opportunity 
structure’ that has been advocated by scholars such as Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow 
(2007). In a democracy, citizens have more channels through which they can engage in 
peaceful contentious politics. While an authoritarian state might choose to quell protests 
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and marches, a democratic state usually allows protests and demonstrations to take place 
in order to allow the citizens to express their opinion (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, Chapter 3).  
According to these results, democracies seem to be more likely to allow peaceful protest 
than violent protests.  
It is now possible to say something about the fourth hypothesis that was 
introduced earlier in the paper. The fourth hypothesis suggests that a large number of 
internet users might be more closely related to peaceful protest than it is to violent 
protest. The empirical analysis in this study does not find any support for this hypothesis. 
A large number of internet users display a negative correlation with both violent (models 
3 and 4) as well as peaceful (models 5 and 6) protest.  
As for the control variables there are no major changes from previous models. A 
history of contentious episodes and protests seem to be influential in determining the 
probability of protest in any given year. This result is robust over all of the tested models. 
For GDP per capita, both models again show that an increase in GDP per capita seems to 
be correlated with an increase in the number of protests. Both models 5 and 6 find this 
relationship to be statistically significant. This finding has been consistent throughout the 
study and raises some questions that demand our attention in the future. I will return to 
this in the conclusion.   
A large population is shown to have a statistically significant and positive effect 
on the occurrence of peaceful domestic protest in both models. While a large urban 
population also displays a positive correlation in both models it remains statistically 
insignificant. There is thus no great difference in the results from these two models and 
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the previous models that have been tested. It appears like having a large urban population 
contributes to the emergence of violent political protests, while having a large urban 
population isn’t as strongly related to peaceful political protest. Unemployment is 
positively correlated with the incidence of peaceful protest in both models and also 
continues to display consistent statistical significance. The higher the unemployment 
level, the more political protests we tend to see. 
Additional controls and robustness checks 
A number of additional controls are now introduced in order to gauge the 
confidence that we can place in the results that just have been presented. These variables 
were not introduced earlier in the study for two separate reasons. First, model 7 
significantly bring down the number of observations and I have therefore chosen to 
present this model as an additional robustness check.. Second, model 8 is introduced 
because of coding decisions that were made when the data was originally collected. 
These two models are introduced in order to show that the results do not significantly 
change because of the removal of ‘special cases’ within the dataset. Because the previous 
models, regardless of whether they included all observations or those that are limited to 
countries with geographically proximate protests, provided us with largely the same 
results I have chosen to only run the following analyses on the entire sample. 
First, model 7 is introduced in order to test a plausible argument that can be made 
regarding the internet and individuals’ ability to effectively use it in order to gather 
information. The argument states that in order for a population to be able to acquire 
information through means such as the internet, the population in question has to be 
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literate in order to understand the information that is provided. An educated population, 
as indicated by a higher level of literacy, might also have a greater in interest in events 
abroad than those populations with a high degree of illiteracy. Therefore, I retrieved data 
for literacy from the World Bank and added it the study. Due to the many gaps in the data 
it severely brings down the number of observations. Literacy is included as a control 
variable in model 7, found below in table 4.  
Table 4 – Additional checks 
 (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Murdie Murdie 
   
INTERNETUSERS -0.021*** -0.007*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) 
PROXPROTEST 0.000* 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
LAGPROTEST 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
POLITY2 0.043*** 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.003) 
logGDPCAPITA 0.678*** 0.361*** 
 (0.095) (0.025) 
logPOPULATION 0.429*** 0.466*** 
 (0.030) (0.012) 
URBANPOPP 0.511 0.201** 
 (0.359) (0.068) 
TOTALUNEMPLOYMENT 0.024*** 0.035*** 
 (0.007) (0.002) 
LITERACY -0.008*  
 (0.004)  
   
Constant -7.494*** -5.611*** 
 (0.810) (0.269) 
   
Observations 226 2,472 
Pseudo. R-squared 0.171 0.164 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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In addition, model 8 is an alternative model of model 1. The Polity IV Project has 
identified cases if “interruption”, “interregnum”, and “transition” within their data. In the 
Polity2 score that has been used in other models, the scores for these regimes have been 
transformed into conventional polity scores in the data set. It is however possible that this 
coding decision affects the results of the analysis. Therefore, model 8 drops these special 
cases from the analysis. 
The analysis provides us with evidence that indicates that literacy is negatively 
correlated with the incidence of protest. That is to say, as literacy increase the number of 
protests decrease. This finding is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. However, due 
to a lack of data the number of observations in model 7 drops to 226.  
As for the hypotheses that have been discussed earlier, introducing literacy into 
the model does not change the relationship between internet users and political protests 
that has been noticeable in previous models. A large number of internet users still seems 
to have a negative correlation with political protest, or unrelated if the results are 
interpreted with some skepticism. Hypothesis one is thus still not supported. 
Geographically proximate protests still remains as an explanatory factory and is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. It is however worth noting that the constant here 
is extremely low and the effect of geographically proximate protests is not likely to be 
that great.. Hypothesis 2 does thus not receive support even when literacy is included as a 
control variable. Hypothesis 3 receives stronger support than in previous models. 
Introducing literacy in the model creates a robust and statistically significant relationship 
between the level of democracy and political protests. According to model 7more 
democratic states will experience more political protests than their less democratic 
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counterparts. Compared to models 1 and 2, this model retains the same signs for 
population and urban population.  
The results of a removal of a number of special cases, based on the coding within 
the Polity IV dataset, are also on display in table 4. There are very few substantive 
differences in the results between the original models (1 and 2) and the new model (8). 
The decision to transform special cases such as interregnum into conventional polity 
scores does thus not seem to substantively impact the results in this study. 
Summary of results 
In this section, I briefly summarize the results that have been presented in this 
section of the thesis. The different hypotheses are discussed in order.  
Hypothesis 1: The results are consistent throughout all of the models that I have 
presented here:  I found no support for the hypothesis which stated that a large number of 
internet users would be correlated with an increase in political protest through diffusion. 
Whether we are discussing violent or peaceful protests, a negative relationship is 
displayed in all of the different models with all of the models also displaying a statistical 
significance for this relationship. This finding suggests that the internet does not 
automatically become a determining factor that increases the number of protests within a 
country. Not even among countries that experience political protest in neighboring states 
does the internet appear to be positively correlated to political protests. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that the internet cannot be a contributing factor to organizing 
protests and other contentious events. Instead, I would argue that these results suggest 
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that we have to pay closer attention to how and by whom the internet is used instead of 
using general measurements for internet usage.  
Let me provide an example of this point. Within a country, political protests and 
organized opposition against various governments is likely to be led by some form of 
elites within that country. While modern technologies played an important role in the 
Philippines and the overthrow of President Marcos (Rheingold 2003), the role of elites in 
organizing and leading the rebellion should not be understated (Tilly 2004). Thus, if 
elites have access to the internet and are able to retrieve information about events, tactics, 
and strategies from abroad, that might be enough to disperse this information among the 
local population in order to organize protests. The data that was gathered and used in this 
project for internet usage is exclusively on a country-level and thus cannot examine this 
phenomenon. What I can say, is that a simple increase in the number of internet users will 
not simply lead to an increase in the number of contentious episodes within a country, at 
least not with the variables that have been used in this study. These results simply do not 
support such a theory. 
Hypothesis 2: Similarly to the first hypothesis, I do not find any support for the 
second hypothesis. While geographically proximate protests appear to be a contributing 
factor to the diffusion of protest, the internet is not found to be a statistically significant 
factor for those protests. While there is no support for the thesis that the internet aids in 
the diffusion of geographically proximate protests, the finding that geographically 
proximate protests remain a statistically significant factor should merit further attention 
and research by scholars within the discipline.  
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Hypothesis 3: The third hypothesis receives some support in the empirical 
analysis that has been conducted here. While the finding isn’t robust across all of the 
models, the evidence indicates that a higher level of democracy seems to be correlated 
with a higher level of contentious episodes. In particular, this conclusion seems to fit on 
nonviolent contentious episodes. A plausible explanation is that peaceful protesters are 
likely to be allowed in democratic states while more authoritarian states might want to 
quell dissident and limit free speech. For violent protests, democratic states also seem to 
have a low tolerance level, as exhibited in the negative correlation between democracy 
and protest that is found in the analysis. All in all, the third hypothesis receives some 
weak overall support in the analysis while it seems to be correct when describing 
peaceful protests. 
Hypothesis 4: The theory stated that the costs of involved in violent contentious 
episodes are likely to be higher than the costs of engaging in peaceful contentious 
protests. Hypothesis 4 posited that a large number of internet users might have more 
potential for inducing people to engage in peaceful protest than in violent protest. Based 
on the analysis, this does not seem to be the case. Across the models that attempted to test 
this relationship, a negative correlation between the number of internet users and political 
protest, violent and nonviolent, appeared. It does not seem like a high number of internet 
users make peaceful protests more likely than violent protests. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have examined the relationship between the internet and the 
diffusion of contentious episodes. Conventional wisdom suggests that the internet has 
played an important role in the diffusion of contentious events. This was allegedly seen in 
the Arab Spring where new outlets praised the potential of the internet to diffuse protests 
and bring down oppressive regimes. Based on this proposition, and previous research on 
the topics of the internet and contentious politics, I created a causal explanation for how 
the internet might contribute to the diffusion of contentious politics. I took into account 
various aspects on how the internet might influence individuals, historical examples of 
diffusion, and research on how the internet affects social movements. This theory was 
later tested through a statistical analysis with extensive protest data. The findings in this 
paper give us no reason to accept the claim that the internet plays an important role in the 
diffusion of contentious episodes across national borders. Instead, the relationship 
between internet usage and contentious politics appear to be much more complicated than 
journalists and conventional wisdom have assumed. In fact, the results indicate a negative 
relationship between internet usage and the diffusion of contentious episodes. For those 
who have been inclined to argue that the internet will usher in a new era of revolutions 
and government overthrows, these results are problematic.  
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For future research there are two possible roads that seem especially worthwhile 
for exploration. First, one possibility is to investigate the different ways in which the 
internet promotes diffusion. For example, is the internet only a contributing factor to the 
diffusion of contentious episodes if it used as a tool by formal organizations? Since this 
study only concerned itself with general measurements for internet usage formal 
organizations and their activities were largely left outside the scope of the study. The 
second possibility is that scholars of contentious politics ought to take a step back and 
investigate other factors, besides the internet, that contribute to the diffusion of 
contentious episodes. What is the effect of refugees, multinational corporations, 
international institutions, and globalization in general on the spread of contentious 
episodes? These are questions that scholars of contentious episodes ought to be 
concerned with in the future. 
However, it is worthwhile to keep in mind that this is just an initial investigation 
on this topic. While this study has shed some light on the influence of the internet on 
contentious episodes, and cast doubt on conventional wisdom, it is merely an initial step 
in expanding our understanding how contentious episodes diffuse in the modern world. It 
is still possible for the internet to play a role in the diffusion of contentious politics, but 
that relationship is likely to be complicated and conditioned by variables that are beyond 
the scope of this initial study. Political scientists, sociologists, and others would be well 
advised to start to identify those cases in which the internet has contributed to a diffusion 
of contentious episodes in order to examine under what conditions the internet aids in the 
diffusion of contention across national borders. In addition to scholars within the 
academic community, policy makers and politicians should be interested in seeing more 
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research on this area. Stable governments have an interest in remaining stable, and would 
be well served by identifying those factors that makes contentious episodes diffuse across 
national borders.  
Among the other findings in this study I will mention a couple of them here. First, 
no obvious connection between geographically proximate protests and domestic protests 
was found in this study. This finding indicates that there are other factors in addition to 
geographical proximity that will create a diffusion of contentious episodes. Chief among 
these, and one that was not included in the study, is culture. While many countries that 
are geographically close to each other share the same cultural foundation, there is also a 
lot of variation. How well do contentious episodes spread between countries of the same 
culture? And perhaps even more importantly, how does it spread between countries 
exhibiting different cultures? For example, the Arab Spring appears to have spread 
among countries in North Africa and the Middle East. While these countries exhibit a 
similar culture, which does in no way mean that the culture is exactly the same in all of 
the countries that are commonly included in the ‘Arab Spring’. So why did large-scale 
protests emerge in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria but not in Algiers, Morocco and Saudi 
Arabia? These questions have not been given adequate answers in this study and provide 
fruitful ground for future research. 
Second, democratic regimes seem to be more prone to experience contentious 
episodes. While this finding is not found to be statistically significant across all the 
models presented, the evidence clearly indicates that this is the case. Democracies, which 
tend to be more open societies, allows for more channels through which people can voice 
their dissatisfaction with their respective governments. This finding is in line with 
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theories surrounding political opportunity structures (Tarrow and Tilly 2007) that have 
been introduced in the social movement literature.  
On a closing note, it seems like Charles Tilly (2004) was right when he warned us 
about simple technological determinism and hyperbole. The internet does not seem to be 
the magical answer to why protests spread in the contemporary world, and we should 
continue to search for those factors that cause contentious episodes to diffuse across 
national borders. 
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